Racial profiling as a defensive counterterrorism measure necessarily implicates a rights trade-off: if effective, racial profiling limits the right of young Muslim men to be free from discrimination in order to promote the security and well-being of others. Proponents of racial profiling argue that it is based on simple statistical fact and represents "just smart law enforcement." Opponents of racial profiling, like New York City police commissioner Raymond Kelly, say that it is dangerous and "just nuts."
. From everything we know about the terrorists who may be taking aim at our transportation system, they are most likely to be young Muslim men." It makes no sense, Sperry contends, to search old ladies or children. Instead, the police should target the high-risk population. Profiling, Sperry writes, is "based on statistics. Insurance companies profile policyholders based on probability of risk. That's just smart business.
Likewise, profiling passengers based on proven security risk is just smart law enforcement." 2 A similar column appeared in the Washington Post the next day, arguing that "politically correct screenings won't catch Jihadists:" "It is a simple statistical fact.
Yes, you have your shoe-bomber, a mixed-race Muslim convert, who would not fit the profile. But the overwhelming odds are that the guy bent on blowing up your train traces his origins to the Islamic belt stretching from Mauritania to Indonesia." Using random bag searches in the New York subways, the column concludes, "is simply nuts." New York City police commissioner Raymond Kelly couldn't disagree more.
"Look at the 9/11 hijackers," Kelly exclaims. "They came here. They shaved. They went to topless bars. They wanted to blend in. They wanted to look like they were part of the American dream. These are not dumb people. Could a terrorist dress up as a Hasidic Jew and walk into the subway, and not be profiled? Yes. I think profiling is just nuts." 4 Racial profiling is, in Kelly's words, "ineffective" because it assumes that terrorists are not going to adapt to changing circumstances, and, as a result, puts the police one step behind the enemy. Racial profiling focuses on an "unstable" trait-a trait that can easily be So, is racial profiling post 9/11 "just smart law enforcement" or is it "just nuts"?
Moreover, does profiling young Muslim men violate the principle of non-discrimination embedded in international human rights and domestic civil rights jurisprudence?
These two questions, I argue, are inextricably linked, and the answer to the first resolves the second: there is no reliable empirical evidence that racial profiling is an effective counterterrorism measure and no solid theoretical reason why it would be. The possibility of recruiting outside the profiled group and of substituting different modes of attack renders racial profiling in the counterterrorism context suspect.
4 Malcolm Gladwell, "Troublemakers: What pit bulls can teach us about profiling," The New Yorker, February 6, 2006 (available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060206fa_fact) (quoting NYPD Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly). 5 Id. 6 Id.
The fact is, defensive counterterrorism measures are notoriously tricky. The spotty empirical evidence tends to show a strong potential for substitution effects. The installation of metal detectors in airports in 1973, for instance, produced a dramatic reduction in the number and rate of airplane hijackings across the globe, 7 but also resulted in a sharp and proportionally larger increase in bombings, assassinations, and hostage-taking incidents. 8 Target hardening of U.S. embassies and missions abroad produced a transitory reduction in attacks on those sites, but an increase in assassinations. 9 Retaliatory strikes produce a spike in short-term terrorist attacks that later level off to the earlier mean. 10 In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that suicide bombers in Israel tended to be young militant Muslim men at first, but now include more There is no empirical evidence whatsoever, nor a solid theoretical reason why racial profiling would be an effective measure-rather than a counterproductive step resulting in detrimental substitutions and increased terrorist attacks. As a result, racial profiling is neither "just" smart law enforcement, nor "just" nuts. sphere-provide that a successful equal protection challenge must rest on evidence of intentional discrimination, rather than on inference from unexplained disparate treatment.
If the police are engaging in statistical discrimination to promote police efficiency, it is not clear whether individuous intent would be present. Moreover, the intentional use of race may be permitted if there is a compelling governmental interest. Fighting terrorism-actually reducing the incidence of terrorist acts-would undoubtedly qualify as a compelling state interest. 30 The key question, for purposes of equal protection, then, is whether the use of race in profiling would be narrowly tailored to serve this interest,
given that the intentional use of race as a factor in policing would trigger strict scrutiny.
31
The requirement of narrow tailoring would preclude policing techniques that are ineffective, or that have unacceptable collateral consequences on the profiled population;
but that determination, naturally, would fall on the courts.
No Need for a Trade-Off
These are all admittedly fascinating questions that deserve our attention. But they only arise if racial profiling is an effective defensive counterterrorism measure. And on that score, there is no reliable evidence, nor a good theoretical reason to believe that 27 481 US 279 (1987) . In McClesky, the Court rejected an Equal Protection claim for lack of a showing of actual discriminatory intent, where petitioner produced evidence that murderers of white victims are 4.3 times more likely to be sentenced to death than murderers of African-American victims. Id at 287, 291-99. 28 517 US 456 (1996) . In Armstrong, the Court required evidence of discriminatory purpose in the context of a selective prosecution challenge. Profiling is a statistical method that draws, methodologically, on an actuarial approach first developed in the insurance industry. But unlike early insurance applications, which were relatively static, 32 profiling in the policing context involves a dynamic form of prediction: the profiling itself alters the behaviors of those persons who are both profiled and not profiled. As a result, the success of profiling will depend on two factors: first, in terms of detecting and preventing terrorist acts, it will depend on identifying a stable group trait that correlates with higher offending-or at least a group trait that is stable enough to serve as a predictive factor during the next period of profiling. And second, in terms of deterring and preventing terrorist acts, it will depend on how responsive different groups are to the targeted policing and whether they engage in forms of substitution. Both of these turn on what we call the comparative elasticity to policing of the two groups-in other words, on how responsive the different groups are to increased police surveillance. Taking a long-term view, profiling will only succeed if young, male, Muslims are more or equally responsive to the increased risk of detection associated with police profiling than the non-profiled group members, and thus are not able to recruit non-profiled persons, nor substitute with more harmful terrorist acts.
The effectiveness of profiling thus turns on the relative elasticity of the different groups-the profiled group of young, male, Muslims on the one hand, and the nonprofiled groups of other persons who might be recruited to commit the terrorist acts in the face of profiling. But on this central question, we have absolutely no reliable data. As an empirical matter, we do not know whether profiling will work in the counterterrorism context or on the contrary cause more terrorist attacks. As a result, there is no need to address the difficult trade-offs that are presented by human rights conventions and civil rights laws intended to eliminate racial discrimination. The important point here, though, is that the issue turns on an empirical and theoretical analysis of the effectiveness of racial profiling, not on a legal or doctrinal review of human rights or civil rights law.
In this paper, I evaluate the empirical case for racial profiling. I explore both the short-term and long-term implications. Surprisingly, although international terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon, there is extremely little reliable empirical research on the effectiveness of defensive counterterrorist measures, and there is no reliable empirical research whatsoever on the use of racial profiling. I argue that this is problematic because, like any other police method, there is a strong potential that a defensive policing technique may backfire-that the use of profiling will actually increase rather than decrease the long-term incidence of the targeted offense. This potential arises from a phenomenon called "substitution"-from the possibility that, in response to profiling, terrorist organizations will either (1) recruit more individuals from non-profiled groups, thereby expanding the overall pool of potential terrorists, or (2) substitute different types of terrorist attacks that are more immune to profiling and yet more devastating in terms of deaths and injuries. And it raises a host of technical empirical questions that are at present entirely unresolved.
Before proceeding, though, it is important to identify precisely the type of measure in question. Broadly speaking, there are two types of counterterrorist initiatives. 33 The first are called defensive or deterrence-based counterterrorist policies.
These are policies that aim to prevent or block the success of a terrorist attack and reduce the likelihood that an attack will cause injuries. As a theoretical matter, there is no doubt whatsoever that the probability of detecting a terrorist attack increases in the immediate aftermath of the implementation of a criminal profiling method. This is simply an inexorable product of the laws of probability: if the police dedicate more resources to investigating and searching members of a higher-offending group, they will inevitably increase the detection of terrorist activities within the profiled group and in society as a whole in the immediate aftermath.
This reflects, theoretically speaking, an iron law of probabilities-and it is
precisely what gives rise to the claim, among proponents of profiling, that it is "based on statistics" 35 and that "It is a simple statistical fact." 36 These claims are correct in the narrow time period following the implementation of a profiling method. The basic intuition is that policing is like sampling in the social sciences: when law enforcement agencies profile members of a higher-offending group, they are essentially sampling more from that higher-offending group. As such, they will detect more offenders with the same resources because, by necessity, those searches are more likely to detect offending.
Thus, profiling on a group trait that correlates with higher offending will necessarily increase the likelihood of detection in the very first iteration. This will have significant benefits along at least two dimensions: first, in preventing the specific terrorist act that is detected, and second, in incapacitating the apprehended terrorist from committing any future acts of terrorism. 40 Although these economic models are being developed in the specific context of racial profiling on highways and city streets, the models apply equally to profiling as a defensive counterterrorist measure.
The logic of the racial profiling models rests on the central assumption of the economic theory of crime, namely that any rational individual is less likely to engage in an activity if the cost of the activity increases. This is what is called, in more technical jargon, the "elasticity of offending to policing"-or "elasticity" for short. The elasticity of offending to policing is the degree to which changes in policing affect changes in offending. Assuming that potential offenders respond rationally to the probability of detection and punishment, then targeting law enforcement on members of a higheroffending population will not only increase the amount of crime detected, but more importantly decrease the offending rate among those members of the targeted group because of the increased cost. In its purest form, the economic model of crime suggests that law enforcement should target higher-offending populations until the point where their offending rates have fallen to the same level as the general population. At that point, the government maximizes the effectiveness of its law enforcement resources.
I have set forth in great detail the logic of these economic models both in the offer a more streamlined description of the analysis and modify the models to address the specific context of counterterrorism profiling.
The central assumption, of course, is that there are two different groups with different offending rates. The profiled group consists of young Muslim men, which, for purposes of the agent on the street translates into young men of apparent Arab descent, young men who look Middle-Eastern, South-East Asian, North African or African, or, more generally, young men of color (excluding young men from East Asia). The nonprofiled group consists of all women, older men, and young white or East Asian men.
As a factual matter, this first assumption is probably correct, at least in the United
States. Of the total population in the U.S., there are extremely few persons of European, Naturally, the appearance of being of Arab descent encompasses many more young men of color, so the denominator is probably higher. But even if we assume that it is one hundred or more times bigger, there is still an offending differential in the range of at 42 Harcourt, "Rethinking Racial Profiling" (2004 least 1:100 for non-profiled versus profiled group members. It would be crucial to get a better handle on this first quantity of interest-but there is, in all likelihood, a significant offending differential.
I will incorporate here, for simplicity, one graph that visually explains the rational choice argument. The graph shows the relationship between the internal rate of searches conducted within each of the two groups and the offending rate of these different groups.
At Time 1, the counterterrorism agents are not engaged in profiling of any sort: the police are searching both groups at the same internal search rate of 10 percent. The graph reflects the basic assumption of non-spurious profiling, namely that young Muslim men are offending at a slightly higher rate than white men and all women-let's suppose 1.5 versus 1 per 100 million-resulting in higher successful search rates for the searches of young Muslim men.
Given the higher marginal success rate for searches of young Muslim men, the police may begin to search that group more than their share of the available population, and, as the proportion of searches targeting young Muslim men increases, the offending rate of that group decreases. This is the fundamental assumption of rational choice, namely that as the cost of offending increases, the rate decreases. The police continue to search marginally more young Muslim men until Time 2 when their offending rate is equal to that of white men and women-1.3 per 100 million. Now the police are using the profile in their decision to search: the police are searching about 18 percent of the available young Muslim men and about 5 percent of the available white men and women, resulting in a hypothetical total distribution of searches of, say, 60 percent young males of color and 40 percent whites. At that distribution of searches, the offending rates are similar-and, one can infer, so are the hit rates. At that distribution, the efficient police officer has no reason to change the distribution of searches: the officer has no incentive to search more young Muslim men than the 60/40 total distribution, which produces these different internal group search rates. At Time 2, even though the police are not allocating any more resources to the enterprise, the number of successful searches has increased and the total societal level of offending has decreased from where it stood at Time 1. In sum, the economic model suggests that profiling will increase the success rate of police investigations and reduce the overall societal level of offending with the same police resources. Naturally, additional judicial resources would be needed to process the increased detection of terrorist activities, though one would expect that those costs would be offset by the harm that would have been prevented.
B. Elasticity Among the Non-Profiled and Possible Substitution Effects
According to the economic model, members of the profiled group are not the only ones who will respond to the change in policing. Members of the non-profiled group are also going to change their behavior as a result of the decreased cost of crime-but in their case, by increasing their offending. So, for instance, if the United States taxing authorities target drywall contractors and car dealers for audits of their tax returns-as they did in the mid-1990s-we can expect that there will be less tax evasion by drywall contractors and car dealers because their cost of tax evasion has increased. But at the same time, we can expect that, say, accountants and bankers will realize that they are less likely to be audited, and may therefore cheat a bit more on their taxes. Similarly, if the highway patrol target African-American motorists for stops and searches-again, there is evidence for this in several states-then we can expect African-American motorists to respond by offending less. But by the same token, white motorists may begin to offend more as they begin to feel increasingly immune from investigation and prosecution. Gladwell 2006. most for the effectiveness of racial profiling is precisely the comparative elasticity of the two groups. If the targeted group members have lower elasticity of offending to policing-if their offending is less responsive to policing than other groups-then targeting them for enforcement efforts will increase the overall amount of crime in society because the increase in crime by members of the non-profiled group will exceed the decrease in crime by members of the profiled group. In raw numbers, the effect of the profiling will be greater on the more elastic non-profiled group and smaller on the less elastic profiled group.
Again, this is true as well in the terrorism context. The central question here is how responsive young Muslim men are to policing and whether they are less elastic than non-Muslim men and women. If they are less responsive overall, then targeted policing may actually increase total incidents of terrorism by encouraging the non-profiled group members to engage in terrorist acts-since the price to them has decreased. This would enable terrorist organizations to recruit more heavily from outside the profiled groupwomen, white men, and others who do not look like young Muslim men.
It is precisely the comparative elasticities of offending to policing that determines whether and how much substitution there is between members of the profiled and nonprofiled groups. This is the central puzzle, but at this theoretical level, there is no good reason to assume that the higher-offending group is as responsive or more responsive to policing than members of the non-profiled groups. After all, we are assuming that the two groups have different offending rates. Whether it is due to different socio-economic backgrounds, to religious fanaticism, to education, culture, or upbringing, non-spurious profiling rests on the non-spurious assumption that one group of individuals offends more than the other, holding everything else constant. If their offending is different, then why would their elasticity be the same? If members of the profiled group are offending more because they are more religious, then might they also be less elastic to policing? There is no a priori reason why the group that offends more should be more or as elastic than the other.
The bottom line, then, is that if the profiled group has lower elasticity of offending to policing, profiling that group will probably increase the amount of terrorism in the In essence, as long as the equilibrium point in offending at Time 2 is achieved above the average offending rate at Time 1, the profiling will produce increased crime in society.
In the terrorism context, the elasticity of offending represents only one form of possible substitution. There are others that can also result in an increased long-term rate of attacks, including, for instance, the use of different terrorist modes of attack that would be less susceptible to detection by profiling. The central empirical questions, then, are (1) whether and to what extent the group of profiled individuals (Arab-looking young males) are elastic to policing; (2) 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Number of Skyjackings Landes 1978:28-29 . Landes also found that the cost of mandatory screening of all passengers was "enormous": The estimated net increase in security costs due to the screening program (which does not include the time and inconvenience costs to person searched) . . . translates into a $3.24-to-$9.25 million expenditure to deter a single hijacking. Put differently, if the dollar equivalent to the loss to an individual hijacked passenger were in the range of $76,718 to $219,221, then the costs of screening would just offset the expected hijacking losses" (Landes 1978: 29) . 52 The underlying data are also available in Charles H. Anderton and John R. Carter, "Applying Intermediate Microeconomics to Terrorism," at 28 ( Second, the decision to have police officers search bags and monitor subway entrances-regardless of whether they profile-already increases the cost of such an attack. What is the incremental difference achieved by racial profiling and will it have any effect on behavior?
Third, even if there is more substitution, might it lead to less harmful attacks? As Enders and Sandler suggest, "Even some piecemeal policies that cause substitutions by focusing on only part of the overall terrorism problem may have some net positive impacts. To the extent that the National Defense Authorization Act leads to a reduction in the likelihood of biological terrorism, substitutions into other attack modes will occur.
The desirability of such policies is that they may force terrorists to substitute into less harmful events. Anti-terrorist policies can be most effective when the government simultaneously targets a wide range of terrorist attack modes, so that the overall rise in the prices of terrorist attacks becomes analogous to a decrease in resources." subways will likely detect a terrorist attack or instead lead to the recruitment of nonprofiled persons and the substitution of other acts for subway attacks-in other words, whether profiling will detect or increase terrorist attacks. The answer to this question is pure speculation. In the end, then, there is no need or reason to engage in a rights tradeoff.
CONCLUSION
There is a lesson here. Defensive counterterrorism measures need to be evaluated closely. As Enders, Sandler, Faria, Tucker, and other counterterrorist experts emphasize, measures that raise the price of one and only one specific activity, such as airplane hijackings, are likely to produce troubling substitution effects; measures that raise the price of all terrorist acts or conversely reduce the resources of terrorists are less problematic and less likely to produce unanticipated substitution. 68 The optimal strategy to combat terrorism is to reduce terrorist resources across the board. It is for this reason that intelligence and proactive counterterrorism operations are generally viewed as a 
